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INTRODUCTION

This article will first discuss the history of Regulation Fair Disclosure
(Regulation FD), the problems it was intended to remedy, the scope of the
regulation, and acceptable methods of disclosing material information in
compliance with the rule.1 Part III will then examine specific further guidance and
two investigative reports issued by the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) impacting Regulation FD disclosures.2 In Part IV, this article
sets forth a comprehensive analysis of all the specific enforcement actions pursued
by the SEC and the penalties assessed against publicly traded companies and
individuals for Regulation FD violations.3 Part V will evaluate the effectiveness of
the rule and discuss whether any modifications may be warranted to clarify the
disclosure requirements and enforce the rule to afford more protection to investors.4
II. THE HISTORY OF REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE AND ACCEPTABLE METHODS
FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAME
The Securities Exchange Act operates to prevent pools and
manipulations in the securities of your companies. It sets up standards
for providing certain minimum information in the solicitation of
proxies. Equally important, it recognizes that officers, directors[,] and
dominant stockholders are fiduciaries and should not trade on inside
information; and accordingly it penalizes certain purchases and sales.5
Thereafter, the Securities and Exchange Commission was created in 1934
with the following express purposes to: (1) protect investors; (2) maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets; and (3) facilitate capital formation.6 As part of the
SEC’s mission to protect investors, and to combat insider trading, “[o]n August 15,
2000, the SEC adopted Regulation FD to address the selective disclosure of
information by publicly traded companies and other issuers.”7
However,
discriminatory disclosure of forecast data by corporate management was previously
1

See infra Part II and accompanying notes 6–33.
See infra Part III and accompanying notes 34–76.
3
See infra Part IV and accompanying notes 77–180.
4
See infra Part V and accompanying notes 181–255.
5
William O. Douglas, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Address at a Dinner given by the Society
for the Advancement of Management for the Delegates of the International Management Congress (Sept.
21, 1938), available at www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1938_0921_DouglasManagement
.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
6
The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 3,
2013).
7
Fair Disclosure, Regulation FD, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/regfd.htm (last visited Oct. 3,
2013).
2
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acknowledged many decades earlier, as follows:
At the same time as many companies announced their projections publicly, a
number of others communicated their expectations to a select few:
Favored analysts might be advised of current budget data either directly
or by letting them know that their estimates were “in the ball park.”
Through a variety of such devices, many corporations sought to be sure
that “market” estimates of their earnings were not far off the mark while
still not taking any public position on the projected results. While the
overwhelming majority of such efforts were done in good faith, the end
result was lack of knowledge as to what forecasts were those of
management as opposed to those of analysts working independently. In
a few cases there was evidence of selective disclosure to institutional
investors interested in the stock and unfair use of such insider
information.8
To address this problem, Regulation FD “provides that when an issuer, or
person acting on its behalf, discloses material[,] nonpublic information to certain
enumerated persons (in general, securities market professionals and holders of the
issuer’s securities who may trade on the basis of the information), it must make
public disclosure of that information.”9 Additionally, Regulation FD, like insider
trading regulations, is a matter of corporate governance, because it affects the
relationship between corporate directors and officers, among other insiders, and the
corporation’s shareholders, on the other.10 Moreover, Regulation FD is justified
because disclosures of material information uphold the SEC’s mission in two
ways—by protecting investors and maintaining fair markets.
A. Potential Issues Remedied by the Adoption of Regulation FD
The first major aspect Regulation FD intended to address was the fact issuers
were disclosing important, nonpublic information, such as advance warnings of
earnings results, to securities analysts or selected institutional investors, or both,
before making full disclosure of the same information to the general public.11 This
type of selective disclosure has been characterized as an “unerodable[,]

8

John C. Burton, FORECASTS: A Changing View from the Securities and Exchange Commission,
available at www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1973_0402_Burton_Forecasts.pdf (last visited
Dec. 12, 2013).
9
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599, 65 Fed.
Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Regulation FD Adopting Release], available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-08-24/pdf/00-21156.pdf; see 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2012).
10
Joan M. Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal Corporate
Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 238 (2005).
11
Regulation FD Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 51,717.
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informational advantage.”12 Although it is important to label this appropriately as a
wrongful advantage, it is consistent with earlier forms of abuse in the trading
markets:
[T]he “Pecora Hearings”[] uncovered a wealth of material about
manipulation, insider trading, [and] breaches of fiduciary duty by the
controlling persons of corporations and other strategically situated
people who profited handsomely out of the financial distress of the
companies that they dominated. It showed how these persons sold the
stocks of their own companies short, concealed material information,
and engaged in other malpractices.13
Consequently, those in possession of this nonpublic information were able to
use this advantage to make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those investors
kept in the dark.14 At its heart, preventing the use of nonpublic information by
industry insiders is a matter of fairness to all investors, especially retail investors.
Nonetheless, the second major issue Regulation FD was designed to tackle
concerned another threat to the integrity of the markets—the potential for corporate
management to treat material information as a commodity to be used to gain or
maintain favor with particular analysts or investors.15
Substantively, Regulation FD requires, when an issuer makes an intentional
disclosure of material, nonpublic information to a person covered by the regulation,
it must do so in a manner that provides general public disclosure, rather than
through a selective disclosure.16 For a selective disclosure that is non-intentional,
the issuer must publicly disclose the information promptly after it knows, or is
reckless in not knowing, the information selectively disclosed was both material
and nonpublic.17 Absent a specified exclusion, selective disclosure may not be
made to the following persons: (1) broker-dealers and their associated persons; (2)
investment advisers, certain institutional investment managers, and their associated
persons; and (3) investment companies, hedge funds, and affiliated persons.18 This
list was expanded with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
12
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (citing Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders,
and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 356 (1979));
see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 8 (1988) (“The investing public has a legitimate expectation that the
prices of actively traded securities reflect publicly available information about the issuer of such
securities. . . . [T]he small investor will be—and has been—reluctant to invest in the market if he feels it
is rigged against him.”).
13
Bernard Wexler, History of the Securities and Exchange Commission, (Aug. 3, 1975),
www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1975_0101_Wexler_History_SEC.pdf.
14
Regulation FD Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 51,717.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 51,716, 51,719.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 51,721.
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Consumer Protection Act, which eliminated the exemption for credit rating
agencies.19
B. The Scope of Regulation FD and Examples of Material Information
The regulation applies to disclosures of “material, nonpublic” information
about the issuer or its securities.20 Relying on prior case law, Regulation FD’s
Adopting Release explains information is defined as material if “there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important” in
making an investment decision.21 To satisfy the materiality requirement, there must
be a substantial likelihood a fact “would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.”22 Instead of articulating a bright-line rule to determine materiality, the
Adopting Release sets forth seven items it recommends should be reviewed
carefully to determine whether they are material: (1) earnings information; (2)
mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures, or changes in assets; (3) new
products or discoveries, or developments regarding customers or suppliers (e.g., the
acquisition or loss of a contract); (4) changes in control or management; (5) change
in auditors; (6) a default or calling of securities, changes to the rights of security
holders, and public or private sales of additional securities; and (7) bankruptcies.23
C. Acceptable Methods for Disclosure of Material Information
Regardless of the type of material information, a company may make the
required disclosure by filing a form 8-K containing the information with the SEC,
or by another method intended to reach the public on a broad, non-exclusionary
basis, such as a press release.24 Moreover, the Adopting Release reflects issuers
should have flexibility to select among methods, or a combination of methods, to
communicate directly with the market.25

19
Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—Accomplishments,
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/accomplishments.shtml#credit (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
20
Regulation FD Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 51,722.
21
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 231 (1988).
22
TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449.
23
Richard Walker, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff:
Regulation
FD–An
Enforcement
Perspective
(Nov.
1,
2000),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch415.htm; see also Regulation FD Adopting Release, supra note 10,
at 51,721.
24
Fact Sheet: Regulation Fair Disclosure and New Insider Trading Rules, SEC (Aug. 10, 2000),
http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/seldsfct.htm.
25
Regulation FD Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 51,716–17, 51,724.
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Acceptable methods of public disclosure to comply with Regulation FD
include press releases distributed through a widely circulated news or wire service,
or announcements made through press conferences or conference calls, which
interested members of the public may attend or listen to either in person, by
telephonic transmission, or by other electronic transmission, including use of the
Internet.26 In particular, the Adopting Release discusses an example of a planned
disclosure of an earnings release that would satisfy Regulation FD if a company
took the following steps: (1) it issued a press release distributing the information;
(2) provided notice of a conference call to discuss the information; and (3) gave the
public the opportunity to listen to the call or view it electronically.27 In defining the
outer contours of a compliant selective disclosure, the SEC cautioned against using
a press release that is not carried by a major business wire service.28 Additionally,
it advised issuers not to deviate from their usual practices if doing so would not
result in an effective, broad, non-exclusionary disclosure of the information.29
D. No Private Liability for Regulation FD Violations
In an effort to avoid the potential for a “chilling effect” on issuer
communications, the SEC decided violations of Regulation FD would not violate
the general antifraud rule—Rule 10b-5.30 As a result, an issuer’s failure to make a
required public disclosure of material information is restricted to violations of
Regulation FD and Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act.31 Consequently, private
plaintiffs may not use violations of Regulation FD as a basis for a lawsuit and only
the SEC may enforce the regulation.32 This decision to limit the scope of liability
appears to have been a concession to large brokerage firms opposing the rule.33
While a concession may have been necessary to initially effectuate the rule, the
time is ripe to reconsider whether its reach should be expanded.

26

Id. at 51,716, 51,723–24.
Id. at 51,716, 51,724.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Written Statement Of the U.S. Securities And Exchange Commission Concerning Regulation FD
("Fair Disclosure") Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov’t Sponsored Enter. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. (2001) (written statement of the SEC), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/051701wssec.htm; see also 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2014).
31
Regulation FD Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 51,726.
32
Id.
33
LAURA S. UNGER, SEC, SPECIAL STUDY: REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE REVISITED,
COMMISSIONER LAURA S. UNGER (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies
/regfdstudy.htm.
27
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III. FURTHER GUIDANCE AND INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS ADDRESSING REGULATION
FD DISCLOSURES
A. SEC Interpretations (October 2000–June 2001)
In response to telephone inquiries, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance
produced a document entitled “Manual of Publicly Available Telephone
Interpretations” that sets forth interpretations of Regulation FD, and appropriate
updates with further examples, on October 2000, December 2000, and May 2001.34
The interpretations consist of eighteen questions and answers designed to elucidate
specific situations where Regulation FD may trigger public reporting
requirements.35 Interestingly, the manual states Regulation FD is not intended to
replace the practice of using a press release to disseminate earnings information in
advance of a conference call or webcast at which earnings information will be
discussed.36 Instead, the SEC confirmed its endorsement of the practice where a
conference call or webcast is preceded by a press release containing earnings
information.37 Although the SEC focused on earnings information because it is
probably the category most affected by selective disclosures, the interpretation
implies this practice applies to all of the categories previously identified as
containing material information. By this period in time, the use of other forms of
technology, especially the Internet and the World Wide Web, had not yet
proliferated, so it is not surprising the interpretations do not provide additional
guidance regarding the dissemination of earnings information or other relevant
categories of information.
B. Motorola, Inc., Investigative Report (November 25, 2002)
As a result of an enforcement investigation, the SEC issued a Section 21(a)
report38 as to “whether Motorola, Inc. (Motorola) violated the federal securities
laws when one of its senior officials selectively disclosed information about the
company’s quarterly sales and orders during private telephone calls with sell-side
34
Division of Corporation Finance: Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations Fourth
Supplement (Includes Interpretations Issued May 2001, December 2000, and October 2000), SEC, (June
8, 2001) [hereinafter Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations], available at
http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone/phonesupplement4.htm.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
The SEC uses a Section 21(a) report as a vehicle to signal how it views a particular problematic
area or set of practices and to provide notice that going forward it will consider similar conduct to be fair
game for enforcement action. Broc Romanek, A Section 21(a) Report History Lesson: SEC Issues New
One
Cautioning
Rating
Agencies,
THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET
(Sept.
1,
2010),
http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/Blog/2010/09/nyse-regulation-transfers-its-regulatory.html.
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analysts in March 2001.”39
In a February 23, 2001, press release and a public conference call, Motorola’s
President and Chief Operating Officer stated sales and orders were experiencing
“significant weakness,” and Motorola was likely to miss its earnings estimates of
twelve cents per share for the first quarter and have an operating loss for the quarter
if the order pattern continued.40
After the conference call, Motorola’s Director of Investor Relations (IR
Director) concluded the analysts had not understood how disappointing the results
were for the quarter.41 Additionally, because the word “significant” was unspecific,
the IR Director wanted to clarify this for selected analysts and relied on Motorola’s
in-house counsel for guidance.42 In this regard, Motorola’s in-house counsel
specifically advised the IR Director:
[H]e could contact selected analysts, reiterate the information
previously disclosed on February 23, 2001[,] and provide quantitative
definitions for certain qualitative terms that were used in the February
23rd announcements. Counsel based this legal advice on the conclusion
that providing a quantitative definition for the term “significant” was
not material. Moreover, counsel also concluded that Motorola’s
particular definition of the word “significant” was public for Regulation
FD purposes.43
Thereafter, the IR Director telephoned every one of the analysts and told them
the prior use of the term “significant” meant a “25% or more” decline. However, in
spite of this follow-up action, Motorola elected not to issue a new press release or
otherwise make any timely public disclosure of this additional information.44
The SEC determined the information selectively disclosed by Motorola was
clearly material because there was a substantial likelihood a reasonable investor
would consider it important if Motorola’s sales were down by 25% or more for the
quarter.45 The report also pointed out 25% was an exact quantitative figure that
should have been disclosed to the public.46 Accordingly, Motorola’s in-house
counsel should have understood there were multiple potential interpretations
investors could have attached to the term “significant,” and it could have meant
39
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
Motorola, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46898, 2002 WL 31650174 (Nov. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-46898.htm.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
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sales were down 50% or more. Moreover, the SEC also warned issuers to be
particularly cautious in private conversations with analysts, especially when
discussing earnings.47 Additionally, concerning the supplementation of prior public
disclosures, the SEC stated its position as follows: “We are particularly troubled
that in this case, after Motorola knew that even securities professionals had failed to
understand the message Motorola purportedly was trying to convey, the company
chose to contact selected analysts only, rather than make broad public disclosure.”48
This precise admonition was noteworthy because the SEC had made it clear
in the June 2001 interpretation Regulation FD does not create a duty to update.49
Nevertheless, because the IR Director relied on Motorola’s in-house counsel in
good faith, the SEC decided not to pursue enforcement on this occasion.50
However, the Section 21(a) report cautions an issuer should not rely upon a good
faith consultation with counsel in the future if this situation arises.51 In particular,
communicating with counsel will not relieve an individual or a company from
liability for disclosing information a person “knows, or is reckless in not knowing,
is material and nonpublic.”52
The Section 21(a) report on Motorola’s conduct is important because it
affirms prior guidance made available by the SEC—issuers and their corporate
counsel must be careful when disclosing material, nonpublic information to analysts
regarding earnings. In this case, Motorola could have avoided scrutiny if it opted to
take one of the following courses of action: (1) it could have issued a press release
and filed an 8-K to clarify the term “significant” meant sales would be down by
25% or more, with a conference call and webcast, or either, to discuss this with the
public and answer questions about this issue; or (2) because Regulation FD does not
impose a duty to update, Motorola could have chosen not to comment on what it
previously meant by “significant” and waited until the filing of the next quarterly
earnings report to release the actual results.53 Nevertheless, the first option is
arguably the better choice because it proactively addresses the issue and, therefore,
should prevent any future allegations of a Regulation FD and Section 13(a)
violation.

47

Id.
Id.
49
Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations, supra note 34.
50
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a): Motorola, Inc., supra note 39.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Of course, an Exchange Act filing other than a Form 8-K, such as a Form 10-Q or proxy statement
may provide another satisfactory alternative that would suffice if the company takes care to bring the
disclosure to the attention of readers of the document, does not bury the information, and does not make
the disclosure in a piecemeal fashion throughout the filing. Regulation FD, SEC (last updated Jun. 4,
2010) http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/regfd-interp.htm.
48
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As we will later see in Part IV, since the situation arose with Motorola, other
issuers clearly received and understood the SEC’s message because there have since
been no occasions where any companies or their executives have attempted to
defend an alleged Regulation FD and Section 13(a) violation by contending they
relied on the advice of counsel in good faith.
C. Interpretive Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites (2008)
By August 1, 2008, the SEC determined it was necessary to publish additional
guidance on Regulation FD.54 In fact, the release requires companies to embrace
the use of technology by numerous means, including the use of websites, satisfying
Exchange Act disclosures by filing them online with the Electronic Data Gathering,
Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR) or making them available on an issuer’s
website, and posting interactive data files on company websites.55 This represented
a significant advance in the SEC’s attitude towards the Internet, both embracing and
mandating the use of technology for public issuers. As an important part of this, the
guidance also makes clear it is necessary to determine whether the information
presented on company websites implicates Regulation FD:
In evaluating whether information is “public” for purposes of the
applicability of Regulation FD to subsequent discussions or disclosure,
companies must consider whether and when: [(1)] a company web site
is a recognized channel of distribution; [(2)] posting of information on a
company web site disseminates the information in a manner making it
available to the securities marketplace in general; and, [(3)] there has
been a reasonable waiting period for investors and the market to react to
the posted information.56
The release identifies factors that can be used to assess the first two elements
to determine whether a company’s website is a recognized channel of distribution
and whether the information posted on its website is “accessible” and, therefore,
“disseminated,” as follows:
Does the company disclose its website address in its periodic reports
and in press releases?
Does the company also disclose that it routinely posts important
information on its website?
54
Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Exchange Act Release No. 58288,
2008 WL 4068202 (Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2008/34-58288.pdf.
55
Id.
56
Kim McManus, Special Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: Commission
Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites (Jul. 30, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2008/spch073008km.htm.
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Has the company made investors and the markets aware it will post
important information on the website?
Does the company have a pattern or practice of posting important
information on its website?
Does the website lead investors and the market efficiently to company
information?
Is the information prominently disclosed on the website? Is it presented
in a readily accessible format?
Is the information on the website regularly accessed by the market and
the media?57
Has a company taken other steps to make the information accessible by
using push technology, RSS fees, or by way of other distribution
channels?
Is the company’s website current and accurate?
Does the company use other methods in addition to its website to
disseminate information?
If so, are these methods the ones
predominantly used to disseminate information?58
For the third element, evaluating what constitutes a reasonable waiting period
depends on the facts and circumstances of dissemination, including:
The size and market following of the company; how frequently investor
information on the company website is accessed; what steps the
company has taken to notify investors and the market that its website is
a key source of important information about the company;
Whether the company has actively taken steps to disseminate the
information or made it available on the website; and,
The nature and complexity of the information.59
The guidance also states for some companies in certain circumstances, it may
be sufficient to disclose information using a website so a subsequent selective
disclosure would not trigger Regulation FD.60 This is acceptable when the website

57
Id. Here, a distinction is drawn between smaller companies with less of a market following and
large, more established companies, with a recommendation for the former to take “more” affirmative
steps to ensure investors know information has been posted on the company’s website. Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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posting is “reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of
the information to the public.”61 And, because intentional disclosures must be made
simultaneously, companies must ensure their websites are capable of complying
with this timing requirement.62 As an example, the guidance suggests a posting on
a blog, by or on behalf of the company, would be treated the same as any other
posting on a company’s website.63 Furthermore, the company would have to
consider the factors to ensure the blog posting could be considered “public” before
proceeding.
Because the 2008 Guidance sets forth a sizeable number of parameters for
online disclosures, it is worthwhile to point out the SEC continued to embrace the
general “facts and circumstances” test to determine whether an issuer’s method of
making a particular disclosure was reasonable.
D. Section 21(a) Report on Reed Hastings and Netflix, Inc. (April 2, 2013)
On July 3, 2012, just before 11:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, Reed
Hastings, the Chief Executive Officer for Netflix, Inc., (Netflix) used his personal
Facebook account to announce:
Netflix had streamed 1 billion hours of content in the month of June.
Neither Hastings nor Netflix had previously used Hastings’s personal
Facebook page to announce company metrics, and Netflix had not
previously informed shareholders that Hastings’s Facebook page would
be used to disclose information about Netflix. The post was not
accompanied by a press release, a post on Netflix’s own web site or
Facebook page, or a Form 8-K.64
On December 6, 2012, Netflix disclosed in a filing with the SEC, on
December 5, 2012, Netflix and its Chief Executive Officer Reed Hastings each
received a “Wells Notice” from the staff of the SEC indicating its intent to
recommend to the SEC it should institute a cease and desist proceeding and/or bring
a civil injunctive action against Netflix and Mr. Hastings for violations of
Regulation FD and Section 13(a).65
In spite of its initial pursuit of an enforcement action, the SEC later reversed
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course and decided to issue a Section 21(a) report to address the situation.66 The
SEC explained it wanted to address this particular situation and to also shed light on
its position regarding the use of social media for disclosures.67 Here, Hastings’
Facebook post was:
[P]icked up by a technology-focused blog about an hour later, around
12:00 p.m. Eastern time, and by a handful of news outlets within two
hours. Approximately an hour after the post, Netflix sent it to several
reporters[] but did not disseminate it to the broader mailing list
normally used for corporate press releases. After the markets closed
early at 1:00 p.m., several articles in the mainstream financial press
picked up the story.68
One of the problems arising from this posting was Netflix’s stock continued
a rise that began when the market opened on July 3, increasing from $70.45 at the
time of Hastings’s Facebook post to $81.72 at the close of the following trading
day.69 Another was Hasting publicly stated “we [Netflix] don’t currently use
Facebook and other social media to get material information to investors; we
usually get that information out in our extensive investor letters, press releases[,]
and SEC filings.”70
As part of the Section 21(a) report, the SEC stated the disclosure of material,
nonpublic information on the personal social media site of an individual corporate
officer, without advance notice to investors the site may be used for this purpose, is
unlikely to qualify as a method “reasonably designed to provide broad, nonexclusionary distribution of the information to the public” within the meaning of
Regulation FD.71 This is true even if the individual has a large number of
subscribers, friends, or other social media contacts, such that the information is
likely to reach a broader audience over time.72 Personal social media sites of
individuals employed by a public company would not ordinarily be assumed to be
channels through which the company would disclose material corporate
information.73 In sum, the SEC’s report cautioned others from engaging in this
behavior going forward.
Besides the Hastings Facebook post, the SEC also communicated its
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expectation a company must take steps to alert the market about which forms of
communication a company intends to use for the dissemination of material, nonpublic information, including the social media channels.74 Providing appropriate
notice to investors of the specific channels a company will use for the dissemination
of material, nonpublic information is a sensible and expedient solution.75 Similarly,
disclosures on corporate web sites identifying the specific social media channels a
company intends to use for the dissemination of material, nonpublic information
would theoretically furnish investors and the markets the opportunity to take the
steps necessary to be in a position to receive important disclosures by subscribing,
joining, registering, or reviewing a particular channel.76
IV. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND PENALTIES
A. A Comprehensive Summary of All Existing Enforcement Actions
Prior to the adoption of Regulation FD, the comments provided to the
proposal ranged from complaints about the rule having a potential “chilling” effect
on communications because it would make determining materiality too risky, with
corporate executives becoming less inclined to discuss important information.77 On
the other hand, people argued against information overload that might result and
impede the dissemination and absorption of the information in a meaningful way.78
To address some of these concerns, Richard H. Walker, the Director for the SEC’s
Division of Enforcement, stated it would be looking for two types of violations: (1)
egregious violations involving the intentional or reckless disclosure of information
that is unquestionably material; and, (2) cases against those who deliberately
attempt to game the system either by speaking in code, or stepping over the line
again and again, thus diminishing the credibility of a claim their disclosures were
non-intentional.79
In reviewing the enforcement actions filed by the SEC, we will see Mr.
Walker’s prediction was accurate. His comment captures the essential intent of
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Regulation FD:
Despite the securities industry’s outcry against Regulation FD and the
flood of alarmist client letters from law firms, Regulation FD was not
intended to be revolutionary, though it was clearly drafted to change
behavior and to end practices that were universally regarded as unfair.80
Notwithstanding this, it took over two years after Regulation FD was enacted
before the SEC brought its first enforcement actions on November 25, 2002.81
Because there have only been thirteen enforcement actions brought by the SEC, the
following represents an exhaustive treatment of the cases.
1.

In the Matter of Raytheon Co. and Franklyn A. Caine (November
25, 2002)

Here, the SEC instituted an administrative proceeding because Franklyn A.
Caine, Raytheon’s Chief Executive Officer, allegedly selectively disclosed
quarterly and semi-annual earnings guidance to sell-side equity analysts.82 The
company’s sales force also sent e-mails to institutional customers about negative
earnings information without simultaneously disclosing the same information to the
public.83
In response, the SEC issued a cease and desist order to Raytheon and Caine
from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Section
13(a) of the Exchange Act or Regulation FD.84 No monetary penalties were
assessed, although Commissioner Campos dissented on this basis.85
2.

In Re Secure Computing Corp. and John McNulty (November 25,
2002)

In early March 2002, Secure Computing Corporation, a Silicon Valley
software company, and its Chief Executive Officer . . . John McNulty,
[allegedly] disclosed material[,] non-public information about a
significant contract to two portfolio managers at two institutional
advisers in violation of Regulation FD . . . . Following the disclosures,
Secure announced the contract to the public in a press release issued
after the close of the stock markets. However, investors who sold
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Secure’s stock prior to the Company’s press release were denied
information that may have affected their investment decisions.86
The SEC issued a cease and desist order to Secure Computing Corp. and
McNulty “from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of
Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act or Regulation FD.”87 No monetary penalties
were assessed, although Commissioner Campos dissented on this basis.88
3.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Siebel Systems, Inc.
(November 25, 2002)

[O]n November 5, 2001, the company’s Chief Executive Officer
[allegedly] disclosed material, nonpublic information to the attendees of
an invitation-only technology conference in California.
At the
conference, the company’s CEO made positive comments about the
company’s business that were based on material, nonpublic information
and that contrasted with negative statements that he had made about the
company’s business in a public conference call three weeks earlier. The
public did not have access to the technology conference and was unable
to benefit from the information that was disclosed at the conference.
Immediately following the disclosures, certain attendees at the
conference purchased the company’s stock or communicated the
disclosures to others who purchased the stock. On the day of the
conference, the company’s stock price closed approximately 20% higher
than the prior day’s close[,] and the trading volume was more than twice
the average daily volume.89
The SEC determined the company violated Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act
and Regulation FD, and the company consented to pay a $250,000 civil penalty.90
4.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Schering-Plough Corp.
(September 9, 2003)

The SEC charged, during the week of September 30, 2002, Schering’s
Chairman and CEO, Kogan, and senior vice president of investor relations met
privately in Boston with analysts and portfolio managers of four institutional
investors.91 Three of these were Schering’s largest investors.92 “[A]t each of these
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meetings, through a combination of spoken language, tone, emphasis, and
demeanor, Kogan allegedly disclosed negative and material, nonpublic information
regarding Schering’s earnings prospects, including that analysts’ earnings estimates
for Schering’s 2002 third-quarter were too high, and that Schering’s earnings in
2003 would significantly decline.”93 According to the SEC, “immediately after the
meetings, analysts at Fidelity and Putnam downgraded their ratings on Schering,
and portfolio managers at those firms and at Wellington heavily sold Schering
stock.”94 Fidelity and Putnam each sold more than 10 million shares of Schering
stock over a three-day period following the meetings, accounting for more than 30
percent of the overall market for that period.95 The price of Schering’s stock
declined during this period by more than 17 percent, from $21.32 to $17.64 per
share, on approximately four times normal volume.96
On October 3, 2002, in the midst of this sell-off, Kogan held a previously
scheduled private meeting with approximately 25 analysts and portfolio managers
at Schering’s New Jersey headquarters, during which he said, among other things,
Schering’s 2003 earnings would be “terrible.”97 Later that evening, Schering issued
a press release providing earnings guidance for 2002 and 2003 that was materially
below analysts’ consensus estimates and, with regard to the full 2002 fiscal year,
materially below the company’s own prior earnings guidance.98
To settle the matter, Schering agreed to pay a $1,000,000 penalty, Kogan
agreed to pay a $50,000 penalty, and both parties agreed to entry of the SEC’s cease
and desist order.99
5.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Siebel Systems, Inc.,
Kenneth A. Goldman, and Mark D. Hanson (June 29, 2004)

Approximately six months after the November 25, 2002, cease and desist
order was issued, Kenneth A. Goldman allegedly disclosed material, nonpublic
information during two private events he attended with Mark D. Hanson in New
York on April 30, 2003, a “one-on-one” meeting with an institutional investor and
an invitation-only dinner hosted by Morgan Stanley.100 The SEC charged, at both
the meeting and the dinner, Goldman made positive comments about the company’s
92
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business activity levels and transaction pipeline that materially contrasted with
negative public statements Siebel made about its business in the preceding several
weeks.101 According to the complaint, based on Goldman’s comments in the April
30 meeting, an institutional investor converted its 108,200 share short position in
Siebel stock into a 114,200 share long position—a net change of 222,400 shares.102
On May 1, 2003, the day following the private meetings, the company’s stock price
closed approximately 8% higher than the prior day’s close, and the trading volume
was nearly twice the average daily volume for the preceding year.103
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, which alleged Mr. Goldman
made four nonpublic, material disclosures violating Regulation FD: (1) there were
some five million dollar deals in the company’s pipeline for the second quarter of
2003; (2) new deals were coming into the sales pipeline; (3) the company’s sales
pipeline was “growing” or “building;” and (4) the company’s sales or business
activity levels were “good” or “better.”104 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed the SEC’s complaint because it
determined none of the four statements qualified as material or non-public
information.105 The court decided the information was public because Mr.
Goldman conveyed essentially the same information previously disclosed by Mr.
Siebel on an earnings call.106 In terms of materiality, the court acknowledged stock
movement is a relevant factor in determining materiality and concluded as follows:
“the mere fact that analysts might have considered Mr. Goldman’s private
statements significant is not, standing alone, a basis to infer that Regulation FD was
violated.”107 Even though the court dismissed the SEC’s complaint because it
believed the statements were too general, it stated the following: “the challenged
communication need not be an expressed verbal or written statement. Tacit
communications, such as a wink, nod, or a thumbs up or down gesture, may give
rise to a Regulation FD violation.”108
The SEC elected not to appeal the court’s ruling. To date this is the only time
Regulation FD was challenged in court and also the only occasion where the SEC
did not prevail.
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In the Matter of Senetek PLC (September 16, 2004)

This matter involved Senetek’s violation of Section 13(a) of the Exchange
Act and Regulation FD on two separate occasions in 2002.109 Prior to December
2001, there were no analysts who were actively providing research information
about Senetek to the marketplace.110 To increase its visibility with investors,
Senetek entered into an agreement with a research firm in December 2001 (Firm
A).111 As part of this agreement, Senetek paid a monthly fee to the research firm,
which, in exchange, agreed to publish research reports about the company.112 In
March 2002, Senetek entered into an agreement with a firm (Firm B) pursuant to
which Firm B agreed to render financial advisory services to Senetek in
consideration for the payment of a monthly fee and other compensation.113 On May
28, 2002, an analyst engaged by Firm B sent an initial draft of a research report to
Senetek’s CEO for his review.114 This draft report contained, among other
information, projected earnings for Senetek’s fiscal year ending December 31,
2002.115
On June 6, 2002, Senetek’s CFO, at the direction of the CEO, sent Firm B an
e-mail containing nonpublic information about the company’s projected revenues
and earnings for the 2002 fiscal year.116 The CFO’s projections were materially
lower than the projections contained in the draft report.117 Senetek did not
simultaneously or promptly release these projections to the public.118 A similar
violation also occurred when Firm A published its final report on Senetek on
September 30, 2002.119 Based on the nonpublic data provided by Senetek’s CEO,
Firm A had lowered the revenues and earnings projections in its final report from
those contained in the draft report provided to Senetek on September 10, 2002.120
The SEC brought an administrative action against the company, it consented
to a cease and desist order, and no monetary penalties were assessed.121
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Securities and Exchange Commission v. Flowserve Corp. and C.
Scott Greer (March 24, 2005)

C. Scott Greer was Flowserve’s Chairman, President, and Chief Executive
Officer and Michael Conley was the Director of Investor Relations.122 On
November 19, 2002, forty-two days before the end of Flowserve’s fiscal year,
Greer, along with Conley, met privately in Irving, Texas, with analysts from four
investment and brokerage firms.123 At that meeting, the attendees discussed
Flowserve’s business, including recent acquisitions, debt covenants, and free cash
flow.124 At one point, one of the analysts asked about the company’s earnings
guidance for the year.125 Neither Conley nor Greer gave the response required by
the company’s policy earnings guidance was effective at the date given and would
not be updated until the company publicly announced updated guidance.126 Conley
did not caution Greer before Greer answered the analyst’s questions.127 In fact,
Conley remained altogether silent.128 Instead, in response to the question, Greer
reaffirmed the previous guidance, which had been issued on October 22, 2002, and
provided additional material, nonpublic information.129 Having heard the exchange
between Greer and the analyst, again Conley was silent and did nothing to explain
Greer’s statements.130 Conley also failed to reiterate the company policy as to
earnings guidance.131
On November 20, 2002, an analyst who attended the meeting issued a report
to the investment firm’s subscribers stating Flowserve reaffirmed its earnings
guidance.132 The report was electronically distributed to subscribers of Thomson’s
First Call.133 The next day, on November 21, Flowserve’s closing stock price was
approximately 6% higher than the closing price the day before.134 In addition, the
trading volume of Flowserve’s stock increased by 75%.135 After the market closed
on November 21, Flowserve furnished a Form 8-K admitting it had “reaffirmed its
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full year 2002 estimated earnings per share.” 136
The SEC filed a civil action against Flowserve and Greer for violating
Regulation FD and Section 13(a) and a separate administrative action against
Flowserve, Greer, and Conley.137 As part of the civil action, Greer agreed to pay
$50,000, and Flowserve agreed to pay $350,000 as penalties; in the administrative
action, Flowserve, Greer, and Conley consented to a cease and desist order.138
8.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chandramowli Srinivasan
(September 25, 2007)

In 1995, Electronic Data Systems, Inc. (EDS) acquired A.T. Kearney, Inc.
(ATK), a management consulting firm with operations in 37 countries (ATK).139
After announcing on September 18, 2002, its earnings and cash flow would fall far
short of prior guidance, EDS’s share price fell over 50 %, causing the trigger
provisions in all of EDS’s remaining derivatives contracts to go into effect.140
Although all of the derivatives contracts were required by their terms to be settled
by year-end in the ordinary course of business, the financial institution demanded
EDS immediately settle the outstanding transactions.141 The settlement occurred on
September 20, 2002, and cost EDS over $225 million.142 EDS personnel disclosed
the $225 million payment to settle the derivatives contracts to securities analysts on
September 19, 2002, and September 23, 2002.143 The SEC determined it was
material to EDS at that time.144 However, EDS did not disclose publicly until
September 24, 2002, it had closed out its position in these obligations through the
issuance of commercial paper and did not publicly disclose the $225 million cost of
the settlement until November 14, 2002.145
As a result of determining EDS violated Regulation FD and Section 13(a) of
the Exchange Act, EDS agreed to pay $490,902 as a penalty, and Srinivasan was
also ordered to pay $70,000 as a penalty.146
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Securities and Exchange Commission v. Christopher A. Black
(September 24, 2009)

Christopher Black was a senior vice president and the CFO of American
Commercial Lines, Inc. (ACL) from February 2005 until April 2008.147 After ACL
conducted an initial public offering of its stock in October 2005, the company
designated Black and its Chief Executive Officer as the company’s investor
relations contacts.148
The SEC’s complaint alleged Black, without informing anyone at ACL,
selectively disclosed material, nonpublic information regarding ACL’s second
quarter 2007 earnings forecast to a limited number of analysts without
simultaneously making that information available to the public.149
More
specifically, the complaint alleged, on Monday, June 11, 2007, ACL issued a press
release projecting second quarter earnings in line with ACL’s first quarter earnings
of approximately $.20 per share.150 The complaint further alleged on Saturday,
June 16, 2007, Black sent an e-mail from his home to the eight sell-side analysts
who covered the company stating ACL’s earnings per share for the second quarter
would “likely be in the neighborhood of about a dime below that of the first
quarter,” effectively cutting in half ACL’s second quarter earnings guidance.151
The complaint also charged Black’s selective disclosure and resulting analysts’
reports triggered a significant drop in ACL’s stock price.152 Lastly, the complaint
alleged, on Monday, June 18, the first trading day after Black’s e-mail to analysts,
ACL’s stock price dropped 9.7% on unusually heavy volume.153
Thereafter, Black consented to the entry of a final judgment requiring him to
pay a $25,000 penalty.154 ACL was not charged with an enforcement action
because of its extensive cooperation and the fact Black acted alone.155
10. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Presstek, Inc., and
Edward J. Marino (March 9, 2010)
The SEC’s complaint alleged, on September 28, 2006, while acting on behalf
of Presstek, Marino selectively disclosed material, nonpublic information regarding
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Presstek’s financial performance during the third quarter of 2006 to a partner of a
registered investment adviser.156 According to the complaint, within minutes of
receiving the information from Marino, the partner decided to sell all of the shares
of Presstek stock managed by the investment adviser.157 The complaint alleged
Presstek violated Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Regulation FD when it did
not simultaneously disclose to the public the information provided by Marino to the
partner, and Marino aided and abetted those violations.158
On March 9, 2010, Presstek agreed to pay a $400,000 civil penalty, and, by
May 15, 2012, Marino agreed to pay a $50,000 civil penalty. 159
11. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Office Depot, Inc. (Oct.
21, 2010)
The SEC’s complaint allege[d] that Office Depot’s CEO, in an attempt
to get analysts to lower their estimates, proposed to the company’s CFO
that the company talk to the analysts and refer them to recent public
announcements by two comparable companies about their financial
results being impacted by the slowing economy. The CEO further
suggested that Office Depot point out on its calls what the company had
said in prior public conference calls in April and May 2007. The CFO
then assisted Office Depot’s investor relations personnel in preparing
talking points for the calls.
According to the SEC’s complaint, the CEO and CFO were not present
during the calls but were aware of the analysts’ declining estimates
while the company made the calls.160 They encouraged the calls to be
completed. Office Depot continued to make the calls despite the CFO
being notified of some analysts’ concerns about the lack of public
disclosure among other things. Six days after the calls began, Office
Depot filed a Form 8-K announcing that its sales and earnings would be
negatively impacted due to a continued soft economy. Before that Form
8-K was filed, Office Depot’s share price had significantly dropped on
increased trading volume.
....
Office Depot agreed to settle the SEC’s charges without admitting or
denying the allegations, and [to] pay a $1 million penalty. Office Depot
also consented to the entry of an administrative order in a separate
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proceeding requiring it to cease and desist from committing or causing
any violations and any future violations.161
Both the CEO, Stephen A. Odland, and the CFO, Patricia McKay, in separate
administrative proceedings, agreed to a cease and desist order and to each pay a
$50,000 penalty.162
12. Securities and Exchange Commission v. David Ronald Allen, et al.
(November 22, 2011)
The SEC’s Complaint alleged defendants David Ronald Allen, the co-founder
and former CFO, and William F. Burbank IV, the former CEO and President of
China Voice Holding Corporation., acting on behalf of the corporation, disclosed
material, nonpublic information to Gerald Patera, a major shareholder, and others
without making simultaneous disclosure of that information to the public.163
Moreover, China Voice did not inform its investors of developments affecting its
financial situation, but it did update Patera about this privately in an e-mail on
December 17, 2009.164 Further, other investors did not receive the same
information until a press release was circulated on April 8, 2010.165
As a result:
Burbank agreed to entry of a Final Judgment permanently enjoining him
from violating Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5
thereunder and from aiding and abetting violations of Section 13(a) of
the Exchange Act and Regulation FD . . . . The Final Judgment . . . also
order[ed] Burbank to pay $60,333 in disgorgement and prejudgment
interest and a civil penalty of $60,000. In addition, Burbank [was]
barred [for] . . . ten years from serving as an officer or director of a
public company and from participating in an offering of a penny
stock.166
Allen agreed to entry of a final judgment permanently enjoining him
from violating Sections 5 and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 10(b)
and 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)
and Rule 10b-5 thereunder and from aiding and abetting violations of
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Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Regulation FD . . . . The final
judgment, entered on December 2, also ordered Allen and his company,
Winterstone Financial Ltd., to pay $225,468 in disgorgement and
prejudgment interest and for Allen to pay a civil penalty of $212,821.
In addition, Allen was barred permanently from serving as an officer or
director of a public company and from participating in an offering of a
penny stock.167
13. In the Matter of Lawrence D. Polizzotto (September 6, 2013)
Mr. Polizzotto was the former head of investor relations for First Solar, Inc.,
(First Solar)168:
In June 2011, First Solar received conditional commitments from the
[Department of Energy] for loan guarantees of approximately $4.5
billion relating to three separate First Solar projects . . . . The loan
guarantees were important to First Solar because they would allow the
company to receive guaranteed low-cost financing from the federal
government. [But,] . . . the loans were conditioned upon First Solar
meeting several requirements prior to September 30, 2011, the last day
on which the DOE could make the loan guarantees.
....
On September 13, 2011, . . . First Solar’s CEO publicly expressed
confidence that the company would receive all three loan guarantees.
. . . [However, o]n September 15, 2011, Polizzotto and several other
executives learned that the DOE had decided not to provide a loan
guarantee [for one of the projects]. [As a result,] . . . Polizzotto and one
of First Solar’s in-house lawyers, began discussing how and when the
company should disclose the loss of the . . . loan guarantee.169
Although it was decided First Solar should address the loss in a formal press
release, on September 21, 2011, Polizzotto moved forward and delivered “talking
points” about the loss to more than thirty analysts and investors.170 In this
conversation, Polizzotto stated there was a low probability the company would
receive the guarantee.171 “[I]n certain discussions, Polizzotto went further than
[t]his and told at least one analyst and one institutional investor that if they wanted
to be conservative, they should assume First Solar would not receive the . . . loan
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guarantee.”172 First Solar’s management learned of this selective disclosure later
that evening and issued a press release about the loss the next morning, prior to the
opening of the market.173 “The company’s stock opened that morning at $68.95,
down 6%.”174
Polizzotto agreed to settle the charges and pay a $50,000 penalty175:
The SEC decided not to bring an enforcement action against First Solar
due to the company’s extraordinary cooperation with the investigation
among several other factors.176 Prior to Polizzotto’s selective disclosure
on September 21, First Solar cultivated an environment of compliance
through the use of a disclosure committee that focused on compliance
with Regulation FD . . . .177 First Solar quickly self-reported the
misconduct to the SEC.178 Concurrent with the SEC’s investigation,
First Solar [also] undertook remedial measures to address the improper
conduct . . . . [by providing] additional Regulation FD training for
employees responsible for public disclosure.179
Additionally, First Solar reported in its 10-Q filed with the SEC, after
completing the internal investigation, the company appointed a new Vice President
of Investor Relations.180
V.

AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATION FD AND PROPOSALS
TO STRENGTHEN THE RULE: DISCLOSURES, PENALTIES, AND CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE
A. The SEC’s Self-Assessment of Regulation FD in Practice

In analyzing the early impact of Regulation FD seven months after it went
into effect, Commissioner Paul R. Carey opined the rule was working “amazingly
well” and clarified it should not supplant stock exchange rules requiring issuers to
disclose certain material information, such as earnings information, in a press
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release.181 Nevertheless, Commissioner Laura S. Unger was more critical,182
releasing a study in December 2001 calling for more guidance on materiality,
increased flexibility for using technology to satisfy Regulation FD, and a
recommendation the SEC should analyze the concerns of issuers.183 Thereafter, the
SEC received complaints after the first batch of four Regulation FD cases were
settled.184 The criticism involved the differences in penalties among the settled
actions, which purportedly sent a confusing message to the business and legal
communities.185 In response, in February 2003, the SEC proposed issuing further
guidance to clarify the rule.186 For many years, however, additional clarification
and revisions to the rule were not forthcoming. In fact, Regulation FD received
only modest attention for several years after the Siebel II defeat in federal court.
This is apparent given only two such cases were pursued between Siebel II and the
2008 financial crisis.187
B. Common Themes of the Enforcement Actions: Breadth and Scope
More than thirteen years have passed since Regulation FD was enacted. To
date, the SEC has pursued thirteen enforcement actions and issued two Section
21(a) investigative reports.188 Of the enforcement actions, all but one of them
resulted in either a cease and desist order or a civil monetary penalty for the
company and its executives.189
Consistent with the categories of potentially material information identified in
the Adopting Release, an overwhelming number of Regulation FD violations
concern the selective disclosure of earnings information to advisers, analysts, and
institutional investors.190 Notable exceptions to this include the acquisition of a
significant contract in the matter styled as In Re Secure Computing and a payment
made to settle derivatives contracts in the Srinivasan matter. The fact the selective
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disclosure of earnings information to outside parties has occurred, and continues to
happen, on a regular basis since August 2000 reveals the passage of Regulation FD
was a positive event because it is protecting investors. Because protecting investors
is viewed as the main aspect of the SEC’s tri-partite mission,191 Regulation FD
appears to be generally functioning as it was intended. By extension, arguments
raised before its passage Regulation FD would “chill” communications of issuers
now appear to be unfounded. Instead, most issuers and analysts appear to have
changed their behavior. This is evident given the analysts raising concerns about
the lack of public disclosure in the Office Depot case. Accordingly, Regulation FD
should be viewed as a regulatory success story.
In terms of breadth, the absence of other Regulation FD violations across the
remaining categories tends to suggest either there are no longer any such
infractions, or this information is being disclosed selectively but is evading the
SEC’s detection. While the former is implausible, given the increase in the number
of enforcement actions filed by the SEC in recent years, another possible
explanation is Regulation FD violations have received lesser priority in light of the
2008 financial crisis; this is a strong possibility given the SEC presently devotes an
entire webpage showcasing its pursuit of misconduct that led to or arose from the
financial crisis.192 Besides this, the SEC has also devoted considerable resources to
investigating Ponzi schemes after Bernie Madoff’s confession, and the Office of the
Inspector General issued its lengthy report about the SEC’s failure to uncover the
scheme.193 With these two major issues catapulting to the top of the SEC’s agenda
for the past several years, Regulation FD violations have likely received lesser
attention based on the agency’s conscious shift in policy and due to its focus on the
Dodd-Frank Act and the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act.194
Another alternative explanation for the small quantity of enforcement actions
involving Regulation FD violations is the line between insider trading and selective
disclosures may be blurry. This was acknowledged in the Adopting Release when
the SEC stated the following: “investors in many instances equate the practice of
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selective disclosure with insider trading.”195 As an example, selective disclosure a
company intends to file bankruptcy may be prosecuted if it is easily identified as an
insider trading violation. This occurred in one notable case where a crude oil
purchasing manager learned an oil company was experiencing liquidity issues, and
he secretly traded on this non-public information several days before the company
publicly announced it was considering bankruptcy.196 In this instance, the public
perception of the SEC’s enforcement may also come into play as the concept of
“insider trading” is well appreciated by the public and has been glamorized by the
media.197 Stated differently, insider-trading cases likely have considerably more
mainstream appeal than cases involving Regulation FD violations.
C. How Different Investors Are Likely Impacted by Selective Disclosures
Concerning the goal of protecting investors against selective disclosures, it
may be worthwhile to consider the different types of investors who are likely to be
impacted by this issue. Historically, the SEC has thought of itself as the “average”
investor’s advocate.198 As explained by Professor Langevoort, this has been
commonly understood to mean individual investors and households, as opposed to
institutional investors.199 In taking this definition a bit further, Mr. Cartwright, the
former General Counsel of the SEC, distinguishes between retail investors who
invest primarily through mutual funds, which he refers to as “intermediated retail
investors” and those who own stocks directly, styled as “unintermediated retail
investors.”200
Regarding institutional investors, it is difficult to envision any potential
problems they would face in the event an issuer commits a violation from selective
disclosure. This is evident for a number of reasons. First, a review of the
enforcement actions to date demonstrates institutional investors have been the ones
benefiting from selective disclosures by issuers. This is because they have been
able to take advantage of the information by moving stock prices dramatically after
discovering the information. Examples of this are present in all but one of the
enforcement actions, the only notable exception being the second case the SEC
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pursued against Siebel Systems, Inc.201 Second, institutional investors are dominant
market players as evidenced by their overwhelming ownership in the aggregate of
73% of the outstanding equity in the 1,000 largest corporations.202 With a vast,
diverse ownership of the majority of large issuers, they exert considerable control
and power over the financial markets. Third, institutional investors have been
characterized as quasi-insiders or outsiders depending on their ownership stake and
long-term trading behavior.203 Fourth, with their direct access to analyst reports,
institutional investors are likely to have much more access to truly valuable
information than a retail investor. Given these foregoing advantages, institutional
investors are highly likely to be able to quickly capitalize on material, public
disclosures made in compliance with Regulation FD whether the disclosure is done
via traditional channels using a press release and an 8-K, through an issuer’s
website, via social media, or a combination of methods.
For intermediated retail investors, there is likely to be a negligible impact if
they invest in a diversified portfolio. Many of these investors, electing to invest in
the market through mutual funds, reduce their risk and enhance their protection by
engaging investment advisers and broker-dealers to execute their transactions.
Additionally, even these investors who regularly buy and sell stock will on average
be benefited as much as harmed by fraud. Consequently, a Regulation FD violation
that occurs for one of this investor’s portfolio is likely to have little to no
meaningful impact on the overall portfolio.
However, selective disclosures are likely to have a much more significant
impact on unintermediated investors.
If material information is disclosed
selectively to analysts, hedge funds, institutional investors, or other third parties
who promptly and profitably exploit the information, this constitutes an unerodable,
informational advantage.204 When the insiders gain such an advantage, which
should also be viewed as information asymmetry, this increases the probability of
market manipulation. While a retail investor may potentially benefit from a volatile
price movement if he or she has a long position on the stock and the insiders drive
the price up, investors without such an edge are much more likely to incur losses.
Besides this, if the insiders acquire an edge shortly before an earnings event, they
will probably accumulate large positions in one direction to capitalize on the
anticipated movement. Knowing a company will likely fail to meet earnings
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expectations, or that an issuer will exceed the analysts’ consensus on estimates,
raises the possibility an unintermediated investor will suffer large losses. While any
investor must realize the risk an earnings event is likely to trigger volatility in the
price of an equity, an unintermediated investor should not be subjected to strong
directional price swings due to an unlevel playing field.
Furthermore,
unintermediated investors who are burned by those who wrongfully take advantage
of selective disclosures are probably less inclined to trust the market and invest in
stocks if they believe the game is rigged by Wall Street.
D. Is the 2008 Guidance Due for Amendments and/or Clarification to
Improve Disclosures of Material Information for Investors?
In the 2008 Guidance, the SEC stated, as a potential example of satisfying
Regulation FD, a posting on a blog, by or on behalf of the company, would be
treated the same as any other posting on a company’s website.205 However, the
illustrative example is potentially problematic in a number of ways. Does it
contemplate a blog will necessarily be on the company’s website? The language is
unclear in this regard, and it is certainly possible a blog may instead appear on a
third-party website. If so, and a blog posting is on a third-party’s website, it is
questionable whether the investing public would receive reasonable notice of this.
As part of this inquiry, it is also possible hyper-linking to a third-party website may
result in the adoption and/or entanglement theories.206 While there have been no
documented instances where a company’s material information was disclosed on a
third-party’s website, this is within the realm of possibilities. When, rather than if,
this happens, whether the resulting disclosure is reasonable will depend on the facts
and circumstances. In this instance, an issuer would be well advised to ensure there
is simultaneous disclosure of the information if it is done intentionally, or promptly
if it was inadvertent, to prevent a Regulation FD violation.
Similarly, assuming a company has “investor relations” or “finances” pages
on its website, disclosure of material information outside of these pages could be
problematic. Even institutional investors would be hard pressed to locate
information if a blog, post, or announcement turns up on a random web page that
has seemingly little to do with investor relations or a company’s finances. If
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something like this happened, it would run contrary to the goal of transparency of
disclosures for investors. Specifically, it would also present an unreasonable hurdle
for the average investor to be forced to spend time searching the website, the site
map, and other areas outside of an investor relations page to locate the information.
Because of this, it is uncertain whether a company’s blog on its own website or on a
third-party website constitutes broad, non-exclusionary distribution. Moreover, if
the goal is to protect investors by providing a disclosure-based regime, then
information should be disclosed in a consistent manner.207 As such, in light of the
foregoing potential questions and issues, the SEC’s guidance has the potential to
become more robust if additional details would be supplied. While flexibility for
issuers is an admirable goal, the SEC has regularly supplied examples of questions
and answers to deal with hypothetical scenarios.208 Accordingly, the time may be
ripe for some additional clarification on these issues. While the Financial Industry
Regulating Authority (FINRA) published guidance on “Social Media Web Sites” in
January 2010, the SEC has not issued any further interpretative guidance to resolve
some of these concerns.209
While the explosive popularity of social media and technology shows no
signs of losing momentum as of late 2013, a major concern is the fragmentation of
information—if investors are required to search for disclosures of material
information in multiple places, there is a risk that retail investors will be left behind.
This is particularly true if a retail investor is attempting to keep up with sell-side
equity analysts whose daily professional existence revolves around closely
following one or two major equities in one sector of the economy. Former SEC
Commissioner, Laura Unger, anticipated the noise, or fragmentation, issue prior to
the enactment of Regulation FD.210 In particular, she voiced her concern about
investors struggling to tell the difference between high quality information being
disclosed online and “noise.”211 With social media in play and companies free to
choose among many different methods for disclosure, it remains to be seen how
long issuers will continue to use traditional methods. While most companies may
likely continue to rely on press releases and the filing of an accompanying 8-K to
fully satisfy Regulation FD instead of posting information solely on their

207
The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Nov. 11,
2013) (“Only through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can people
make sound investment decisions.”).
208
Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations, supra note 34.
209
Guidance on Blogs and Social Networking Web Sites, FINRA (Jan. 2010),
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/Notices/2010/P120760.
210
Laura S. Unger, Comm’r, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by the SEC Commissioner:
Rethinking Information about Issuers in the Age of the Internet, (Feb. 18, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch258.htm.
211
Id.

46

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. VIII:I

company’s website, this raises an important issue—if a company posts on its
website instead of the traditional approach, there may be a potential delay for the
information to reach investors. Also, such a posting may not reach the news media
as quickly as if a press release were issued and distributed by the major news wires.
Stated differently, this could create a new burden on investors in the sense they
would become obligated to search and discover information posted on multiple
company websites instead of relying on major news sources like Bloomberg
Television and CNBC. However, one can easily imagine a potential rebuttal to this
problem of investors scrambling for information by supporters of the semi-strong
version of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis.212 Supporters of this are likely
to argue whether the SEC’s mandate for issuers to use technology to make material
disclosures results in more hurdles for retail investors to obtain information is
immaterial because the current price of any equity will arguably include all of the
known, available information. The problem with this position, however, is
unintermediated investors who have a small portfolio of stocks are more likely to be
left in the dust if this happens than intermediated investors holding on to mutual
funds.
In light of the foregoing concerns, only nine published comments were
submitted in response to the 2008 release.213 Only one of the comments, which was
submitted by the CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity (CFA),
requested guidance with more certainty.214 The CFA’s comment objected to the
proposal to allow posting on a company website alone because it would allow a
company to avoid making an 8-K filing by using this alternative approach.215
Moreover, the CFA argues the SEC should reject the “facts and circumstances”
approach because it creates a risk investors will not receive certain information they
are entitled to receive under Regulation FD. Although the CFA’s point is a bit
vague in this regard because it fails to provide any specific factual examples, the
CFA asserts clearly a “public filing” requirement should not be circumvented with
information solely appearing on a company website.216 Instead, the CFA proposes a
combination of methods similar to what the SEC found acceptable in the past, in
which a company issues a press release and posts the information on its website
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instead of filing an 8-K with the press release.217 In this manner, the CFA’s
position is sound: it permits companies to use their websites to post information,
and the dissemination will be broad enough to reach the masses with a press release.
Because this is largely consistent with the current practice, issuers will not see an
increase in costs either, and may enjoy a cost savings by not having to prepare and
file an 8-K.
The SEC has previously rejected the approach advanced by the CFA, and it
has done so with good reasons—to promote flexibility, to encourage the use of
technology, and to promote disclosure through a combination of methods. Taking
this into consideration, it is easy for issuers to meet their disclosure obligations
under the facts and circumstances approach, and it probably results in less time
spent enforcing violations than if a “bright line” rule were in place. Moreover,
issuers are free to choose, based on their judgment and the SEC’s guidance, whether
they should use a sliding scale for disclosure of items based on whether they are
less material or more material. For ones of greater significance, the traditional route
may be preferable. Items of smaller concern may be better suited for disclosure via
social media or through a combination of methods. Disclosing whether a company
reached a certain metric, such as streaming one billion hours of content like Netflix
did, falls into more of a gray area, unless the company previously announced its
intent to use a particular social media site.
E. Additional Issues Presented By Disclosures Using Social Media
One problematic issue identified by the SEC’s 21(a) report is Reed Hastings’
Facebook friends included, among others, equity research analysts associated with
registered broker-dealers.218 These analysts would have been the first to receive the
disclosure and capitalize on the information for trading. This is precisely what
Regulation FD was intended to remedy and punish—the disclosure of information
that provides insiders, such as analysts, with an “unerodable[,] informational
advantage.” It is also a sign of an unlevel playing field between the institutional
and retail investors. And, because there was a significant jump in the price of
Netflix’s stock in the period after the Hastings post and into the next trading
session, it appears reasonable to conclude the “smart money” profited enormously
because of this.219 While this may not have presented a problem for institutional
investors and long term retail investors who had bought the stock before the
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Hastings Facebook post, it probably had a significant impact on any investors who
would have shorted the stock, or purchased put options, between the issuance of the
post and the close of the trading session. As an example, shorting 1,000 shares of
the stock between $70.45 and the closing price of $72.04 on July 3, 2012, at an
average price of $71.25 would have resulted in loss of at least $3,000.220 Because
Netflix’s price rocketed upwards on July 5, 2012, covering a short position at the
high of the day, $82.90, would have netted a loss around $11,650. Of course, a
hedge fund or an institutional investor who received early notice of the Facebook
post would likely have taken the other side of the trade and profited substantially.
A second issue concerns the distinction that can be drawn between registering
and subscribing to social media. For Twitter,221 any person can view the tweets,
whether they are registered or unregistered.222 However, for Facebook, you must be
a Facebook member to view postings. This raises the question of whether an issuer
can realistically achieve broad, non-exclusionary disclosure of information for a
“members only” website and its postings. Arguably, it is comparatively more
difficult to achieve a broad, non-exclusionary disclosure if membership is required.
Regardless, this did not stop Netflix from contending the opposite—a post reaching
over 200,000 Facebook members was broad enough to reach the market and a
sufficient amount of investors.223 While the 21(a) report did not squarely address
this, it is an interesting issue and murky enough to provoke a lively debate. For
issuers who would prefer to avoid a public debate and SEC scrutiny going forward
on topics like this, it may be safer for compliance purposes to use a combination of
methods using sites that do not have a members-only requirement.
The third potential problem is the proliferation of multiple social media
channels may also make it harder for individual investors to track a group of their
investments.
While an issuer may utilize a combination of methods to
communicate directly with the market, there is a potential problem when the
number of media channels reaches a certain level. For example, Netflix itself has a
“Social Media Disclosure” page on its website with hyperlinks to six separate sites:
(1) The Netflix Investor Relations YouTube Page; (2) The Netflix Blog; (3) The
Netflix Tech Blog; (4) The Netflix Facebook Page; (5) The Netflix Twitter Feed;
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and (6) Reed Hastings’ Public Facebook Page.224 While not every publicly traded
company is likely to announce material financial information across six or more
media channels, this possibly makes it more difficult in general for investors to
receive the information and specifically to obtain it in a timely fashion. Also, if a
company like Netflix uses all these distinct media channels for material disclosures,
there is the strong chance the information will not be disclosed simultaneously.
Therefore, this may present an imbalance where a follower of social media X
receives an update at a specific time and trades on it immediately, while a follower
of social media Y does not receive the news until a point later in time. And,
whether this failure to achieve simultaneous market disclosure is a result of a
technical glitch or market manipulation is irrelevant if an individual investor has no
recourse and the only potential punishment an issuer faces is an enforcement action
from the SEC.
Alternatively, as social media continues to progress, other services will
inevitably be embraced and utilized by the public. The issue that will arise is when
a social media site achieves enough prominence to be considered a public site. This
will, of course, depend on the facts and circumstances. And, in terms of Regulation
FD, does the use of the particular social media site provide broad, non-exclusionary
distribution? Until it becomes readily apparent a site will provide enough
distribution, issuers would be well advised to use a traditional approach or a
combination of newer, yet more established ones to cover enough bases to prevent
allegations of selective disclosure.
F. Penalties
If disclosure is the most laudable goal, then a focus on preventative
maintenance and education should be a top priority for issuers, the top executives,
and investor relations personnel. This includes C-Suite executives, whose “titles
tend to start with the letter C, for chief, as in chief executive officer, chief operating
officer, and chief information officer.”225 Issuers should ensure the C-Suite
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Social Media Disclosure, NETFLIX, http://ir.netflix.com/social-media-disclosure.cfm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013). The page states the following:
Investors and others should note that we announce material financial information to our
investors using this investors website, SEC filings, press releases, public conference calls[,] and
webcasts. We also use social media to communicate with our subscribers and the public about
our company, our services[,] and other issues. It is possible that the information we post on
social media could be deemed to be material information. Therefore, we encourage investors,
the media, and others interested in our company to review the information we post on the U.S.
social media channels listed below. This list may be updated from time to time.
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2013).
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executives and investor relations personnel receive education and training to avoid
selective disclosures from occurring inadvertently or intentionally. As part of this,
the executives should receive specific policies and procedures with concrete
examples designed to prevent selective disclosures. Presumably, such a compliance
program is already in place for most large, well-seasoned issuers, but the larger
companies have also been the ones liable for many of the recent violations,
including Netflix and Office Depot. Nevertheless, the SEC’s guidance and
information concerning materiality could easily be boiled down to its constituent
parts to assist with compliance efforts. Moreover, because the disclosure of
earnings information has resulted in the most enforcement actions, this is a topic
deserving special attention. Furthermore, an emphasis should be placed on
company and individual penalties in the event a Regulation FD violation occurs.
In three of the thirteen enforcement actions, no penalties were imposed,
although cease and desist orders were issued to deter against future violations.226 In
two cases, issuers were ordered to pay $1,000,000 in fines,227 but the highest
penalty ever awarded against a corporate executive was $50,000 for a “pure”
Regulation FD violation without other charges of securities law violations.228 In
closely examining the Regulation FD violations, it is useful to consider whether the
SEC is pursuing the correct parties. This is because many of the penalties being
paid out are by corporations. The problem with this is it may unfairly harm the
shareholders and result in a “double whammy” where the shareholder may already
have been injured by the selective disclosure itself and a penalty may add insult to
injury.
1.

Which Parties Should the SEC Pursue for Regulation FD
Violations?

The imposition of civil monetary penalties against a corporation is a relatively
recent creation and raises concerns about the SEC’s mission of investor
protection.229 In cases in which shareholders are the principal victims of the
violations, the SEC, when appropriate, will seek penalties from the individual
offenders acting for a corporate issuer.230 In terms of the policy supporting
penalties, the justification offered by the SEC is “variable-penalty provisions are
appropriate to penalize and deter the broad range of conduct for which these

226

See supra Part IV and accompanying notes 77–180.
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penalties will be assessed.”231
The SEC may understandably have to make tough, discretionary choices
when it comes to determining whether to pursue a corporation only, or also include
its managers. This situation is likely to arise in a case where the evidence against
individual executives is weak. As a result, the SEC may decide to pursue the
corporate entity because it is easier and more favorable to do so. Another reason
why the SEC may elect to pursue the issuer only is that an individual may be more
likely to fight a matter through trial instead of settling if the executive has to pay for
a settlement out-of-pocket instead of relying on the corporate reserves. Such an
individual may be motivated to clear his or her name to attempt to avoid any longterm damage to his or her reputation. Additionally, the SEC’s decision may also
come down to an allocation of resources; if pursuing individual executives is likely
to consume more time and resources, then it may not be worthwhile to pursue them.
As part of this evaluation, the SEC may not want to allocate resources pursuing
large penalties against individual managers with negligible assets or name
recognition, because pursuing the corporation may result in more publicity and a
greater perception of deterring illegal conduct.232
However, in spite of all of the foregoing issues that may arise in pursuing
individual executives, the ultimate problem is less deterrence may result if potential
fraudsters are able to evade punishment for their actions. Instead, a much greater
amount of deterrence will probably result if management realizes there is a strong
possibility of serious, individual penalties that may result from Regulation FD
violations. Shifting the focus to individual accountability is something at least one
of the SEC’s Commissioners recently acknowledged is important for an effective
enforcement program.233 Commissioner Aguilar articulated it elegantly, as follows:
“The fact remains that corporations and other business are led by men and women,
who are ultimately responsible for their actions. When an entity is charged with a
violation of the federal securities laws, it is clear that there are human beings who
are responsible for the misconduct.”234
This approach to securities regulation has long-standing roots, receiving
support from A.A. Berle, Jr., lawyer, diplomat, and member of President
Roosevelt’s Brain Trust, who was the co-author, with Gardiner Means, of The
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Modern Corporation and Private Property, a groundbreaking work in corporate
governance.235 He articulated his position in this manner:
There are only two ways yet known of protecting investors. One is
flatly to prohibit certain kinds of corporate activity, trusting that you
will catch in your net of prohibition the dodges through which
investors’ savings are usually lost or dissipated. That is not a good way;
because the business processes of today are complex; conditions change
overnight; honest corporate managements not only want but [also]
thrive under a wide freedom of action. The other method is to give your
corporation pretty wide latitude in what it does, within reasonable
limits; and then make your directors and officers personally liable for
any abuse of the machinery. In substance, you can say to people,
[‘]Take all the power you want; but you, individually, are responsible
for the use of the power[.’] I think by a process of common law we are
getting to this latter view; but whether we are or not, it is pretty clear
that legislation will put us there before very long.236
Of course, the punishment should fit the crime in a manner consistent with the
underlying action, and the SEC has issued specific criteria it uses to determine the
extent of the misconduct and whether there are mitigating factors.237 Although
deterrence is important, careful scrutiny of the SEC’s thirteen separate factors is
necessary to ensure a minor violation does not result in a senior executive getting
fired, losing all, or a substantial part of, his savings, being banned from serving as
an officer or a director, and suffering considerable harm to his reputation.238 Along
these lines, as part of a stronger compliance program, it would be desirable to
educate would-be fraudsters to these possible punishments as part of a worst case
scenario for the most egregious violations. Consequently, while Regulation FD
sought to prevent selective disclosures to analysts, placing the focus on responsible
executives instead of just pursuing corporations for quick settlements may represent
the next paradigm shift that results in less misconduct. Symbolically, it also fits in
with the SEC’s recent policy shift towards taking more cases to trial, which
presents, in the words of Chair Mary Jo White, “an open forum for public
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accountability.”239
Overall, whether it is the corporation itself and possibly a handful of
executives facing an allegation of a Regulation FD violation, the end result is the
shareholders are probably the ones to suffer the most. This is because the
investigation and ensuing litigation that results from a potential violation distracts
management from the business, drains corporate resources, and harms the
corporation’s reputation.240 This negative chain of events is exacerbated when a
corporation pays the penalty, which further adds to shareholder injury.241
Accordingly, the next section proposes increasing the penalties against individual
executives who violate Regulation FD, with part of the goal being to protect
shareholders from being penalized when this occurs.
2.

Penalties Should Be Enhanced to Increase Deterrence of
Regulation FD Violations

There are several ways in which deterrence can be increased for C-Suite
executives, which is important because people, not corporate entities, are the ones
engaging in wrongdoing. First, Congress should raise the current $50,000 limit
considerably higher on individual executive penalties for Regulation FD
violations.242 The main reason for increasing the limit is a maximum penalty of
$50,000 lacks any real teeth, let alone sharp teeth that genuinely enforce the rule.
This is particularly the case for executives earning tens of millions of dollars
annually, where a $50,000 fine is less than a slap on the wrist.243 For example, in
2010, when Stephen A. Odland, the former CEO of Office Depot, settled his
enforcement action and paid a $50,000 penalty, he made over $15.2 million.244
Facing such a small penalty, it is highly unlikely a C-Suite executive such as
Odlund is ever deterred from wrongfully disclosing material, non-public
information to industry insiders, to the detriment of retail investors. With such a
small potential maximum fine, it begs the question of whether the sharing of
selective information is even on the radar of executives like this. To send a strong

239
Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, The Importance of Trials to the Law and Public
Accountability, Address at the 5th Annual Judge Thomas A. Flannery Lecture (Nov. 14, 2013), available
at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540374908#.Uopf9o0eDiU.
240
Atkins, supra note 232, at 400.
241
Id.
242
Section 21(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes a $50,000 penalty
for a natural person committing “second tier” violations. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No.
112–58 (Aug. 10, 2012).
243
Steven M. Davidoff, A Vote Goes Against Outsize Executive Pay, but it’s Hardly a Blow, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/a-vote-goes-against-outsize-executivepay-but-its-hardly-a-blow/?_r=0.
244
Steve Odland, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/profile/steve-odland/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).

54

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. VIII:I

message to discourage this behavior, the current rule should be amended and
strengthened to impose penalties based on the facts and circumstances of the
wrongdoing, which is consistent with the existing general framework for
penalties.245 Although Congress took a step in the right direction with the
introduction of a bill styled as the “Stronger Enforcement of Civil Penalties Act of
2012,” 246 known colloquially as the SEC Penalties Act, which would increase the
limits on penalties, the bill will likely die in committee. For egregious, willful
misconduct, which shows deliberate indifference or unadorned venality, the
penalties should be exponentially higher to establish a meaningful correlation to the
worst selective disclosures.247
Second, there are other means that even publicly traded corporations can
employ to encourage a real change that prevents these disclosures. On the front
end, an issuer who is mindful of this situation could rewrite the employment
agreement when it hires new C-Suite executives to include a provision requiring the
settlement of an SEC enforcement action for a Regulation FD violation results in an
automatic waiver of an annual bonus, stock options, or a golden parachute
severance provision. This would increase the odds an executive would refrain from
selective disclosures when something like stock options are on the line. For
someone like Reed Hastings, the CEO of Netflix, this is particularly significant
because 75% of his salary for 2012 and half of his pay for 2013 will consist of
compensation through stock options.248 And, for Mr. Hastings, because Netflix’s
stock has risen 300% in 2013, the stock options represent a staggering amount of
money.249 Thus, the loss of stock options or possibly other compensation could
serve as the carrot-and-stick approach to discouraging selective disclosures.
Third, the rules restricting the pursuit of Regulation FD violations could be
loosened to include private shareholder litigation. If limiting the scope of liability
was done only to ensure passage of Regulation FD by appeasing large brokerage
firms, then the time is ripe to revisit a modification to the rule.250 This is even more
apparent given Regulation FD was passed in an era that was anti-regulatory,
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especially now the pendulum has swung in the other direction with the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which was passed to reshape the
United States regulatory system in a number of areas, including but not limited to:
consumer protection, trading restrictions, credit ratings, regulation of financial
products, corporate governance and disclosure, and transparency.251 If private
lawsuits are permitted, shareholders could still remain protected if the costs of the
lawsuit are borne by the responsible executives. Shareholders would be protected if
the corporation pays the penalty for an individual executive.
Fourth, in conjunction with the earlier suggestion to modify an executive’s
employment agreement, another potential alternative would be including a
provision that ensures the employer is not required to indemnify the rogue manager
if there is a settlement reached with the SEC concerning Regulation FD
violations.252 While the typical C-Suite agreement may already contain a provision
prohibiting indemnification for willful misconduct, this would take it a step further
to avoid the potential for disputes between executives and corporations as to
whether the conduct is willful or not. Regardless, the net result would be to place
the burden squarely on the shoulders of the executive to pay for the defense of any
investigation and legal costs, not the corporation. It would also provide standing for
the corporation to seek declaratory relief that it is not obligated to pay for an
executive’s legal fees. Overall, the net effect of this would be to protect the
shareholders and actually provide them with some form of restitution in the event of
misconduct.
3.

The Future of Regulation FD

One of the most positive aspects to emerge from the SEC enforcement actions
is the cultural shift in the industry, which has taken place since the regulation was
enacted. Specifically, the Office Depot case reveals even the analysts were
concerned about the C-Suite executives failing to make public disclosures of the
negative earnings information. This information is significant because it tends to
show Regulation FD is working at a broad level, which includes other parties in the
industry beyond issuers and their top brass.
Along the same lines, a potential new concern for issuers is whistleblowers.
“The SEC’s whistleblower program went into effect on July 21, 2010, when

251
See supra note 192; see generally Viral V. Acharya, Thomas Cooley, Matthew Richardson, &
Ingo Walter, Manufacturing Tail Risk: A Perspective on the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 4 FOUND. &
TRENDS IN FIN. 249 (2010), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html
/tail_risk.pdf.
252
Chester S. Spatt, Chief Economist, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff: “Penalties and
Sanctions for Securities Fraud”: Remarks Before the American Economic Association (Jan. 6, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch010607css.htm.

56

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. VIII:I

President Obama signed the ‘Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act’ into law.”253 “The Commission is authorized by Congress to
provide monetary awards to eligible individuals who come forward with highquality original information that leads to a Commission enforcement action in
which over $1,000,000 in sanctions is ordered.”254 By the same token, deferred
prosecution agreements (DPAs) may have a similar effect of encouraging
cooperation from individuals and companies to provide the SEC with information
about misconduct and even assist with a subsequent investigation.255 Regardless of
the technique utilized by the SEC to ferret out instances of misconduct, with
increasing penalties in recent years for violations of Regulation FD, it is not
difficult to envision third parties seeking to take advantage of a whistleblower
reward if an issuer selectively discloses material, non-public information.
Alternatively, a management insider with knowledge of a selective disclosure but
no active participation in the misconduct may be able to escape liability using a
DPA. Ideally, if these possibilities of whistleblower rewards and DPAs make
issuers at the top level uncomfortable with sharing information selectively, then this
should also deter possible violations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regulation FD serves an important function in ensuring proper compliance
with the U.S. securities laws, especially when it comes to discouraging selective
disclosures and preventing insider trading. This protects retail investors and creates
a level playing field. If unerodable, informational advantages do result, then the
focus of future enforcement actions may best be directed to combat the wrongdoing
by the responsible individuals. Flowing from this idea, innocent shareholders
should not have to suffer if the company itself did not engage in wrongful conduct.
This article is intended to begin a list of possible amendments to improve and
strengthen the rule, through improving disclosures and also in the context of
individual versus corporate penalties. With executive compensation being an
important topic, the SEC should be receptive to considering new possibilities to
enhance monetary penalties against executives who willfully violate the rule. With
enhanced compliance programs in place and regular training, we may see less
Regulation FD violations. This is particularly evident if C-Suite executives face
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much stiffer penalties, including the loss of stock options and legal fees paid by the
issuer. The net result of augmenting the penalties should be to deter future
violations and inspire confidence and trust in the market.

